UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN RE: Chapter 11

. Case No. 14-22048 (RDD) BUHRE BEVERAGE

DISTRIBUTION, INC.,

Debtor.

WILLIAM SANCHEZ, Adv. Case No. 14-08218 (RDD)

Plaintiff,

VS.

BUHRE BEVERAGE

DISTRIBUTION, INC.,

300 Quarropas Street White Plains, New York 10601

Defendant.

. Monday, November 3, 2014

11:40 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION TO APPROVE (1) SALES PROCEDURES;

(2) BIDDING PROCEDURES;(3) BREAKUP FEE, IF APPLICABLE;(4) THE FORM AND MANNER OF NOTICE;(5) THE SCHEDULE FOR AN AUCTION AND SALE HEARING; (6) AUTHORIZING THE SALE OF SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE DEBTOR'S ASSETS FREE AND CLEAR OF ALL LIENS, CLAIMS, INTERESTS AND ENCUMBRANCES, GRANTING THE SUCCESSFUL BIDDER GOOD FAITH STATUS, WAIVING THE TEN-DAY STAY OF THE SALE ORDER, AND

(7) GRANTING SUCH OTHER RELIEF AS PROPER; MOTION TO FILE PROOF OF CLAIM AFTER CLAIMS BAR DATE; MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY; MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT D. DRAIN UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

APPEARANCES: (Continued)

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WHITE PLAINS, NEW YORK, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 2014, 11:40 A.M.

THE COURT: Okay. <u>In Re: Buhre Beverage</u> Distributions as well as Sanchez v. Buhre Beverage

Distribution. Okay. Are we ready to go ahead?

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MS. PENACHIO: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. So there are a number of matters on the calendar today but it seems to me it's probably best to proceed with the sale motion first.

MS. PENACHIO: Your Honor, I agree. Anne Penachio for the debtor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. And everyone can sit 12 down unless they're speaking. Just say who you are when you first speak and who you represent.

MS. PENACHIO: Your Honor, this is the debtor's motion to approve the sale of the -- substantially all of its assets pursuant to Section 363 and related provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

Your Honor, you approved bidding procedures in or about August 2014. In accordance with those bidding procedures, I actively noticed the sale to all -- or I think a broad range of potential bidders. Approximately ten bidders expressed an inquiry. I promptly sent of anyone that made an inquiry a copy of the bid package.

I received one deposit and offer, however -- from Mr. Poli. Unfortunately, Mr. Poli had not been approved by Pepsi

and was not considered a qualified bidder. I returned his deposit upon learning that he was not -- had not been approved by Pepsi and was not qualified. The only -- I would respectfully request that the Court request the debtor's motion to sell the property to the stalking horse bidder, Mr. Cappelli [ph] who's here in the courtroom today.

THE COURT: Okay. And he has of course been approved by Pepsi.

MS. PENACHIO: Your Honor, he has been approved by Pepsi. There is a letter approving him. And he was the only bidder that is qualified at this point, and I believe that the sum paid is fair and reasonable particularly after aggressively trying to get other people to bid as set forth in my reply affidavit.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I reviewed the objection and declarations filed in connection with this matter including Mr. Israel's declaration. I'm happy to hear from anyone on the objection.

MR. MC AULIFFE: Good morning, Your Honor. Michael McAuliffe on behalf of William Sanchez. We had filed a very brief objection to the sale relying principally upon the arguments we've set forth in our adversary proceeding that Mr. Sanchez we believe should be declared to be a secured creditor. We maintain that he's owed in excess on a million dollars. We also believe that the collateral which should be the subject of

his security interest includes the route as well as the trucks.

Background, Judge: We had filed a limited objection initially when the debtor brought on the motion to have the sale initially teed up. We submitted a counteroffer. counteroffer was not approved by Your Honor, and we understood that my client needed to be approved by Pepsi as part of his application.

Pepsi had made it abundantly clear to us in the record that he was never going to be satisfactory to them so we never tendered a bid. But we would ask that Your Honor deny the debtor's application based upon the reasons that we believe we will prevail in the adversary proceeding.

THE COURT: But if you -- I'm sorry. objection is not on the basis that you have a higher and better bid, right?

MR. MC AULIFFE: Well, I think there are other parties that are interested. I don't want to speak for them --THE COURT: But yours is not on that basis.

MR. MC AULIFFE: No, Judge, because you had said that we needed to be approved by Pepsi in order to tender a bid and

> THE COURT: Right.

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MR. MC AULIFFE: -- since we knew that that was Your 24 Honor's directive, we also knew that Pepsi would never approve us as per their own stated position. So --

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THE COURT: Right.

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MR. MC AULIFFE: -- we did not tender a bid. We're not approaching this from that perspective, Your Honor, although I do understand that there other individuals and entities who have --

THE COURT: Have raised that issue.

MR. MC AULIFFE: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But not in respect of your client's interest to buy it; it's really in respect to their interest to buy the --

MR. MC AULIFFE: Correct, Judge. They stand on their own --

THE COURT: It would -- okay. And, as far as Mr. Poli and Mr. Brown, are they here?

MR. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. My name is Christopher Smith and I represent their interests. They're here; they're ready to answer any questions that you'd like. Their position is they are ready, willing, and able to submit a higher and better bid than the current -- our understanding of what the current bid is of the stalking horse.

Additionally, their position is that the -- by your deadline of September 5th that they submitted a bidding package to debtor's counsel complying with all of the conditions except they never did have approval from Pepsi despite -- and they're ready again to give testimony that they sought -- we recently

sought it before today's hearing as well in writing and we were turned down.

While Pepsi certainly has the right to weigh in on who they think are appropriate bidders, I think that there should be some limit placed on that ability. Here -- the only reason that Mr. Israel gave for turning down my client is suppose -- Mr. Poli is because he has a vending company that delivers a lot of Pepsi products, has done so since at least 1980; in fact is one of the ten largest vending -- from what he tells me one of the ten largest vending companies for Pepsi Beverages, and so because of that, they don't typically approve a distributorship for somebody who is also involved in vending.

My client has advised me after he was advised of Mr. Israel's declaration that he would be willing to divest himself of that vending business, sell it to another entity so that he could become a qualified bidder and that he has the wherewithal to bid, and particularly whereas here it appears that the stalking horse bidder might be significantly less than both what my client is willing to offer and what the fair value for the route is that I thought that we should be here before Your Honor --

THE COURT: What is your client willing to offer?

MR. SMITH: Well, so far, we have -- I think the

current stalking horse bid as I understand it. There's a fivehundred-thousand-dollar note and another hundred thousand

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dollars on the table. My client has on the able at least 615,000 which would be -- include the 500,000 on a note plus another 115,000 but he's willing to go up over that and I could caucus with him for a couple of minutes if you need to know a number that's significantly more than that. My understanding is he's willing to go higher and --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SMITH: -- and he has the wherewithal to do so. We posted earnest money of \$60,000 with debtor's counsel back on September 5th when we submitted the bidding package. Debtor's counsel when she didn't schedule the auction -- and understandably so -- returned the check which we've been holding in this office. So it's our understanding that that money should still be in her court.

If the Court were to schedule an auction or otherwise qualify Mr. Poli and Mr. Brown to bid, then we would of course return the check and leave the earnest money in place. We're also willing to participate in any due diligence that debtor's counsel or anybody else may need here to ascertain their wherewithal. I've brought some information related to appraisals of my client's residence and the mortgage. We believe there's more than enough equity to go well above the current stalking horse bid.

THE COURT: When did your client learn of the reason for being turned down by Pepsi?

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MR. SMITH: Well, in writing, we received it -- just recently we received -- when we filed last week, we filed something in writing to Mr. Peter Gorday [ph] and Mr. Israel and he responded in writing the reasons that they would not approve him.

He did have -- it's my understanding that he did have some verbal conversations with Pepsi previously and it wasn't clear to him at that -- it was clear to him that he would not be approved but it wasn't clear to him exactly the reason why he would not be approved by Pepsi.

THE COURT: And -- okay.

MR. SMITH: And it's still not completely --

THE COURT: And what is involved in giving up the vending business? What's involved in that? I mean, how hard is that to do? Can it be done promptly? I don't know.

MR. SMITH: Yeah. I mean, it depends on who it would have to be transferred to. It's -- from what I understand, it's a thriving vending business that could probably be sold. He could transfer it either to another family member relatively quickly or he could transfer it to a third party and, you know -- I could certainly look into that and get you a better answer to that question if Your Honor needs that.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you talk to him about what he's prepared to offer.

MR. SMITH: All right.

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(Pause.)

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MR. SMITH: Judge, after caucusing with my clients and this again isn't written in stone, it's subject to even further inquiries but they're willing to increase from 615 another \$50,000 so we can make it 665.

Now, I would also mention, Judge, that Mr. Brown was previously approved by Pepsi for the purchase of -- I have a letter that's dated June 12th, 2013.

THE COURT: So --

MR. SMITH: He was with another partner --

THE COURT: So are they working together, Mr. Poli

12 and Mr. Brown?

MR. SMITH: If they were successful in bidding on a distributorship, then the understanding is -- because Mr. Brown has significant experience in running the route, driving the route so he would be involved in logistics, operations, and continuing that process. And Mr. Poli would be providing the financing and other administrative tasks necessary to run the distributorship.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SMITH: And that number again is not written in

22 stone.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SMITH: We just added 50,000 --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SMITH: -- because it's a round number. 1 2 THE COURT: Right. Okay. All right. Is anyone here 3 for -- from Pepsi? MR. WALDMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Thomas Waldman, 4 5 Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis. THE COURT: Is Mr. Israel here? 6 7 MR. WALDMAN: Mr. Israel is not here today. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. WALDMAN: My understanding, Your Honor, first of all with respect to Mr. Brown as is set forth in Mr. Israel's declaration, Mr. Brown's approval was in connection with a 11 totally different transaction. In fact --12 13 THE COURT: No, I understand Mr. Brown. He --MR. WALDMAN: Yeah --14 15 THE COURT: -- he's really tied into Mr. Poli as far as --16 17 MR. WALDMAN: With Mr. Poli --THE COURT: -- his transactions. Sorry. 18 19 MR. WALDMAN: -- the concern is that Mr. Poli's vending machines are in territories far and wide, and if Mr. Poli is a distributor -- Mr. Poli's vending business purchases 22 from distributors. The distributorship arrangement is based on exclusive territories. There are sound business reasons why 23 2.4 Mr. Poli was not --

THE COURT: I agree with that --

MR. WALDMAN: -- and --1 2 THE COURT: -- although he's now saying he will get 3 out of that business. MR. WALDMAN: Well, he's saying he'll get out of the 4 business and sell it to family member or to a third party. 5 knows if that's a legitimate sale or a sale to a straw person -7 THE COURT: Well, it's to a third party I'm assuming. 8 Does Pepsi need to approve that business or that transfer? 9 10 MR. WALDMAN: I don't know, Your Honor. I don't 11 believe so. 12 THE COURT: When did Pepsi give Mr. Poli the actual reason for --13 MR. WALDMAN: Well, it was given in writing as Mr. 14 Smith said at the end of last week, but Mr. Poli had not

submitted a written application until last week. My understanding is that there were telephone conversations during the period when bids were being accepted and Mr. Poli was told that he would not be approved.

THE COURT: But not why.

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MR. WALDMAN: I don't know whether the reason was given, Your Honor. I don't believe he was ever told specifically why. Also we've had great difficulty getting an audience from Pepsi to even discuss that.

MR. SMITH: Judge, I would just point out that with

CHH SHOOR ADOLLA ZUB-OF . ZUB -ULIVUD. CIVOCO SOOS LA-COLLADAY ≥≥≥ <addou⊢ratiour-0--01 ·00E respect to Mr. Brown he was approved for the purchase of the Buhre Beverage --

THE COURT: No, I -- the point that's -- it's a legitimate point that Pepsi is making is that it appears to me and I think to Pepsi that Mr. Brown while a -- an experienced driver and someone who understands this business is not the money behind the deal, is not the ultimate administrative party behind the deal, and therefore, that person is important and here it's Mr. Poli, and if Mr. Poli continued on as the principal of the vending machine business, then it seems to me a deal with Mr. Poli which Mr. Brown is associated with is -- you know, is perfectly fine for Pepsi to reject.

MR. SMITH: Well, but Mr. Brown is certainly an integral part of this deal. He signed --

THE COURT: Well, I know but that's -- but the -- when you say this deal, it's the deal with Mr. Poli. So the conflict issues are present there. Mr. Brown isn't offering to buy it separate and apart from Mr. Poli, right?

MR. SMITH: Well, we discussed that.

THE COURT: Well, but he -- if he was, he would have made an offer. I mean --

MR. SMITH: Well, he did make an offer with -- in conjunction with Mr. Poli.

MR. SMITH: But I mean, he would have made a separate offer where he would buy the business as opposed to working

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with Mr. Poli.

MR. WALDMAN: And, Your Honor, I would add that Pepsi may well have other legitimate reasons.

THE COURT: Well, they haven't been stated.

MR. SMITH: I think we all need additional information at this point, Judge, and the Judge shouldn't approve the sale at this point. Let me see if I can address the vending machine issue. I mean, any business transaction has the potential for a situation to arise as Pepsi has discussed, and that's not a valid reason for not approving them as a qualified bidder.

THE COURT: Well, it is a valid reason if he stays owning that business.

MR. SMITH: Yeah, but he's ready to represent that we'll -- that would be a condition precedent to him bidding is that we come up with something -- some kind of arrangement that's acceptable to the Court --

THE COURT: Well, timing is important here thought. But I understand your point.

Has there -- is there any consideration to Pepsi from the stalking horse bid or bidder?

MR. WALDMAN: Well, Your Honor, there's the cure provision.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WALDMAN: And, of course, that would apply to any

-- you know, to any purchaser.

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THE COURT: Right.

MR. WALDMAN: I don't think I understand Your Honor's question.

THE COURT: Is Mr. Cappelli providing any separate consideration to Pepsi?

MR. WALDMAN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WALDMAN: I mean, there's a question about whether -- I think there's an issue about how the cure provision is interpreted, whether the cure comes from sale 12 proceeds or whether the cure comes from the purchaser above and 13 beyond sale proceeds.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WALDMAN: And I think that Your Honor's -- Your 16 Honor's bid procedures order insofar as it required Mr. Sanchez to post a bond for the full purchase price plus the cure indicates that Your Honor considers the cure provision would come directly from the purchaser above and beyond the purchase price.

THE COURT: Right. And is that --

MR. WALDMAN: So, in that respect --

THE COURT: Is that Mr. Cappelli's bid?

MR. WALDMAN: Mr. Cappelli is represented here today.

THE COURT: Okay.

食は 田〇と 下するはろりようりょう ・ 上し CHICAD XONNEN HA ZUB-OF . ZUB -ULIVUD. CIVOCO SOOS LA-COLLADAY ▼▼ ・4月日00-14月201-01-00円 MR. FAGA: Respectfully, Your Honor, Kevin Faga for Mr. Cappelli.

Our understanding is that the Court's order indicates that the cure money to Pepsi has to be paid from the closing table. The money at the closing table is the purchase price, and as long as Pepsi is satisfied, that is a -- that's currently a debt that's owed to Pepsi by the debtor.

So, from these assets, in order for the debtor to sell the assets to Mr. Cappelli or to anyone, the debtor has to ensure that these debts -- that these assets transfer free and clear of all encumbrances. As such, it has to satisfy its franchise agreement with Pepsi so Pepsi will be made whole. We submit it should be made whole from the purchase price because again, it's the debtor's obligation to Pepsi.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. WALDMAN: Except, Your Honor, that --

THE COURT: -- is Pepsi -- is the way this would be documented Pepsi accepting on consent an assignment of the distribution agreement or is there a new distribution agreement that's --

MR. WALDMAN: I believe what happens, Your Honor, is that a new distribution agreement is entered into.

THE COURT: And has that happened?

MR. WALDMAN: Has it happened? No. If I may, Your Honor, Mr. Cappelli was given an approval letter by Pepsi --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WALDMAN: -- as part of the process prior to Mr. Cappelli submitting the stalking horse bid, and the approval letter specifically conditioned approval on the cure.

THE COURT: Right. Okay.

MR. WALDMAN: Actually, you know what, from a practical standpoint, I don't think Pepsi cares whether it's paid out of the sale proceeds or out of the separate -- out of a -- you know, a payment made above and beyond the sale proceeds.

THE COURT: What is Pepsi's cure?

MR. WALDMAN: Pepsi's cure is the thirty-six-thousand-dollar administrative claim that it has filed and all of its attorney's fees incurred in connection with both the Sanchez adversary proceeding and this proceeding.

THE COURT: Okay. Maybe I'm wrong. My understanding is that the debtor really hasn't been engaged in business for a while. Is that correct?

MS. PENACHIO: Yes, Your Honor, that is correct. Shortly after the filing, Pepsi -- there were some checks that were dishonored. Pepsi exercised its right to take over the route. Mr. Sapra, Bhaveen Sapra, the principal of the debtor did not oppose that Pepsi would run the route and has been cooperating with Pepsi to --

THE COURT: So Pepsi has been running the route.

MS. PENACHIO: Pepsi has been running the route. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MS. PENACHIO: So --THE COURT: All right. 4 5 MS. PENACHIO: -- you know --THE COURT: I --6 7 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I'm sorry to interrupt but there's one other thing just for policy considerations, it's --I think it's in the debtor's best interest to have at least a 10 process where --11 THE COURT: I agree. 12 MR. SMITH: -- and you could address the vending issue if you establish new bidding procedures and --13 THE COURT: Well --14 15 MR. SMITH: -- because of the time that's elapsed you may want to put that on the short leash but by establishing new 16 bidding procedures seeing if my client can qualify --17 THE COURT: I don't need to establish new bidding 18 19 procedures but I do believe that there should be some extra time for Pepsi and Mr. Poli to talk about the potential for a 21 satisfactory resolution of the impediments to Pepsi granting an approval. 22 23 MS. PENACHIO: Your Honor, may I be heard on that point? Mr. Poli contacted me back in early September. 24 25 THE COURT: Right.

MS. PENACHIO: I was very, very accommodating. I 1 promptly sent him information. I spoke to his attorney --3 THE COURT: It's not -- the only --MS. PENACHIO: He didn't do anything for months. 4 THE COURT: No, no, he --5 MS. PENACHIO: And --6 7 THE COURT: I think the issue -- Pepsi told him they weren't going to take him. Okay? And --8 9 MS. PENACHIO: Right. But he waited a month before 10 submitting an application, two months --11 THE COURT: Fine. But Pepsi just told him the reason a few days ago. And if there's a potential here to get an 12 auction going, it's to everyone's interest. 13 MS. PENACHIO: Absolutely. 14 15 THE COURT: And I don't see who's being hurt in the 16 meantime. 17 MS. PENACHIO: I agree with that; it's just very 18 frustrating because -- on both ends because I think Mr. Poli 19 should have promptly submitted a written application instead of 20 waiting for two months. 21 THE COURT: Well, I --22 MR. FAGA: Respectfully, Your Honor, on behalf of the 23 -- of Mr. Cappelli, Mr. Poli says he just got an answer last week. He just submitted an application last week. 24 followed the bidding procedures and submitted an application at

least, then I could see him coming in and saying, Judge, I need more time, we're trying to work it out with Pepsi.

MR. SMITH: He's been trying to get --

MR. FAGA: He didn't even do that.

MR. SMITH: He's been trying to get an audience with Pepsi for months.

THE COURT: I don't --

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MR. SMITH: I've been trying to get an audience with Pepsi.

THE COURT: I don't know if the application has a line for -- or the response says, you know, you have to give a reason. As far as I can find for today --

MR. WALDMAN: I don't believe it does, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WALDMAN: -- and frankly --

THE COURT: I need a reason and it hasn't been given until recently and Mr. Poli has given a -- I believe a good faith response to it which is he's willing to divest his business. So I think that Pepsi should speak with him promptly. I don't want to delay this too long but on the other hand the route is being run by Pepsi so I don't think Pepsi is hurt by the delay.

MR. SMITH: Well, Your Honor --

THE COURT: And Pepsi is right. I mean, it obviously
-- it has two goals here. One is to get its cure claim paid,

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whatever that is as a proper allowed claim and the other is to have a third party take over the route promptly but there's another goal here, too, which to maximize the value of the estate and I think that's an important one, and I think that perhaps there is a fault to the bidding procedures in that it didn't require Pepsi to say why they were turning someone down but I think they should look at that promptly. And I can give you an adjourn date within thirty days on that score.

I believe there was enough of an ambiguity in the procedures for that. I'm not going to open this up to anyone else but I am going to put a deadline on the conclusion of the discussions with again, you know, a reason -- if there is to be an objection a reason given that would be ten days before the hearing date that you'll get for this lead and if Pepsi is okay with him or what he's proposing, has a way to divest himself of his vending business, then we'll have an auction which could be a day before the hearing.

MS. PENACHIO: Very well, Your Honor. So I will circulate a proposed order that -- should I make a new auction date or --

THE COURT: Yeah. You need to get a date from Ms. Lee of the hearing --

MS. PENACHIO: Okay.

THE COURT: -- and I would want that within a month.

I don't -- that will be a contested hearing so hopefully we can

do it before a month but the auction would be a day or two before then if Pepsi provides consent to Mr. Poli which would be, you know, a week before then if they do it one way or another.

MS. PENACHIO: Very well, Your Honor. And the debtor welcomes a bidding process. It's just frustrated that --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. PENACHIO: -- it didn't happen in September.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WALDMAN: And, obviously, Your Honor, from Pepsi's perspective, we don't -- we feel as though we've been through a bidding process --

THE COURT: I don't.

MR. WALDMAN: -- so Pepsi has very patient --

THE COURT: You know what? It could have given him the reason since he said he's willing to adjust his whole business based on the reason that was given. And it may just want the guy.

MR. WALDMAN: I'm sorry, Your Honor?

THE COURT: And they may just want the guy. You know, if it truly is just the conflict and he says I'm prepared to deal with the conflict and he has the driver in his deal, maybe they would have.

MR. WALDMAN: I suppose that's possible, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I hope it is.

MR. WALDMAN: In the interim --

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THE COURT: And I hope it isn't just because they like someone else for whatever reason. You know, I will want to hear Mr. Israel as to whether there's any, any notion of any inside deal here. All right? On the record. He submitted a declaration and he's not here, and that's the other reason I'm adjourning this.

These franchise-type situations can get very ugly very fast. Witness the Dunkin Donuts case that began the calendar today. I think it was in litigation for about five years. So I think Pepsi wants its T's crossed and I's dotted on this.

Okay? So, on the other objection, Mr. McAuliffe, as you say it -- the basis for your objection is really the debtor's reliance on 363(f)(4)

MR. MC AULIFFE: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So we can turn to that now because you 18 have your summary judgment motion on.

MR. MC AULIFFE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I will say that there will -- and I'm holding off Pepsi's motion for a stay because if I conclude that your client essentially has a veto here, then in all likelihood I would lift the stay but I want to hear the summary judgment motion first.

MR. MC AULIFFE: Thank you. Judge, I think this has

CEROSE XDOUGH ZUB-05 . ZUB -ULNUD QV000 SOOS LA COLLADA ≥≥≥ <addou⊢ratiour-0--01 ·00E been fairly extensively briefed by both Mr. Sanchez and we've received opposition from the debtor.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. MC AULIFFE: If I can summarize what we believe are the key points. We are seeking to have Your Honor reform the transfer documents related to the sale of the Buhre Distribution route as well as certain property items consisting of two trucks that have been used in connection with servicing the route.

The case law that we have cited in our memorandum --THE COURT: Well, you're looking for more than that. 12 You're also looking to have relief under UCC -- let me try to find the right section here -- UCC 9-506(a) saying that the UCC one that was filed contained only minor errors or omissions and that the UCC is not seriously misleading --

MR. MC AULIFFE: Correct, Judge. And, in fact, there were two UCC filings; there was the initial UCC-1 filed and then there was an amendment filed prior to the filing date.

> THE COURT: Right.

MR. MC AULIFFE: Attempting to correct it. I don't believe it fully accomplished that.

> THE COURT: Right.

MR. MC AULIFFE: And that was performed by my client's predecessor counsel --

> THE COURT: Right.

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MR. MC AULIFFE: -- who was involved with the transaction.

Judge, we think that the intent of the parties can be gleaned from the record before you. I think that the debtor has acknowledged there was mistake involving the transfer documents. I believe the debtor has also acknowledged that my client was indeed intended to be a secured creditor with regard to the assets being transferred.

THE COURT: I don't think they have acknowledged that.

MR. MC AULIFFE: I'm sorry. I believe they've acknowledged that we're entitled to be a secured creditor. I think their position is, Judge, that the -- which I believe is not a credible position is that the Buhre Distribution route was not intended to be included in the collateral. We think that that position is not credible --

THE COURT: Well, the agreements and the UCC -- and the amended UCC-1 all say that what secures the obligation is the distribution agreement by and between Bruckner Beverage and Pepsi which in essence is a future agreement, right?

MR. MC AULIFFE: Correct, Judge. It was in artfully drafted.

THE COURT: Well, that's pretty specific.

MR. MC AULIFFE: But we're -- I think there can be no rational dispute that the asset means almost a Buhre route.

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THE COURT: Well, can I --

MR. MC AULIFFE: And the truck --

THE COURT: You say it's absurd to provide for that type of collateral but isn't at least arguably equally absurd to agree to pay \$900,000 for something where you need Pepsi's approval and you don't have it yet?

MR. MC AULIFFE: Well, I believe there was an approval letter. That's the June 2013 approval letter issued to Mr. Sapra and to Mr. Brown. Now, Pepsi has argued that that is not the same transaction which was memorialized by that July 31st transaction --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MC AULIFFE: -- but it essentially is the same transaction. They -- Mr. Brown is known to Pepsi. Mr. Brown is a driver. Mr. Brown I believe is still driving for other distributors at that location. Again, Judge, we think it's -- I think the intent of the parties can be gleaned from the evidence. I understand that there is a dispute that has been interposed with -- in connection with what the collateral was but I think it's been admitted in the affidavit -- the affirmation, Your Honor, from Mr. Sapra as well as their counter 7056 statement and memo of law that they do acknowledge that there was intended to be a secured transaction here. Inartfully drafted, we all know that.

THE COURT: Well, the issue though is secured by

what? I mean, I don't -- maybe I'm wrong. Looking at the Rule 7056 statement or more aptly counter statement, I think that they don't admit that or the debtor and Mr. Sapra never did.

They admit that -- who the purchaser was and who the seller was, was backwards or incorrect. They're very clear on that. So we're really just talking about the collateral and, you know, he says the UCC was correct for example, on Page 11, Paragraph 28, again in Paragraph 31, in his affidavit, Paragraph 30.

MR. MC AULIFFE: Judge, I acknowledge their counter

THE COURT: Put it differently, if you can't sell the route unless you have Pepsi's approval, how could he grant a lien on it? He could only grant a lien on the future deal.

MR. MC AULIFFE: I think they were basing it upon the July 2013 approval letter but that evidenced Pepsi's --

THE COURT: But I think that -- isn't that a factual issue on whether Pepsi had actually signed off on this deal? I mean, otherwise, he wouldn't have it to pledge.

MR. MC AULIFFE: Judge, my understanding is Pepsi did not have a problem with this transaction until this case was filed.

THE COURT: Well --

THE COURT: Because it's not been articulated to me.

THE COURT: But --

MR. MC AULIFFE: I've never seen any evidence of their questioning the transaction that took place. Again, this filing was precipitated by my client's scheduling a UCC sale by his predecessor counsel and then there was the filing. And then Your Honor may recall the debtor brought on an order to show cause to punish my client for violating the automatic stay for purportedly operating the route and interfering.

My client was present that day. We filed opposition, and if you recall, Your Honor, my client took the stand and he was determined to be credible --

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. MC AULIFFE: -- with regard to his statements and averments. I believe he has credibility. I would also counter by saying that the debtor's principal does not have credibility.

THE COURT: Well, but let me just -- I mean, just on the 7056 statement, Paragraph 24 of Mr. Sanchez's 7056 statement says that:

"At the July 31st meeting the parties confirmed the terms of the transfer of the shares of Buhre from Sanchez to Bruckner, the agreed-upon transaction."

And it lists, you know, that Sanchez would transfer a hundred percent of the shares to Buhre -- in Buhre to Bruckner for the sum of 1,150,000 payable as he sets forth there.

Sanchez would receive two promissory notes from Bruckner, again

reflecting the consideration. Sanchez would receive a security interest in the shares of Buhre and all of its tangible and intangible assets including the Buhre Pepsi route which was initially held under the distributor agreement between Buhre and Pepsi and would later be held under the distributor agreement between Bruckner and Pepsi once B. Sapra was able to obtain same. So he hadn't gotten it yet, and then D says Sanchez would retain one share of stock in Buhre until such time as Bruckner obtained its distributor agreement with Pepsi.

So I mean under his 7056 statement, it's clear that they hadn't gotten the agreement yet.

MR. MC AULIFFE: Actually, Your Honor, I -- with all due respect, I'm referring to that letter and this is also annexed to Mr. Poli's declaration. This is the June 12th, 2013 Pepsi -- it's a conditional approval letter and Your Honor has seen -- I have an extra copy I can pass up if it's helpful but it says:

"We are happy to inform you that your request for the purchase of Buhre Beverage Distributor, Inc. has been approved. Final approval is based upon the update on your" -- and says paren -- "Bhaveen Sapra green card status and details on allowances and restrictions attached to this green card."

We would submit there was a conditional approval, the parties relied upon it, and then closed the transaction.

Unfortunately, the transfer documents were completely in error.

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Remarkably in error and --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. MC AULIFFE: -- I know we have a -- you know, in a normal bankruptcy context, Judge, it's difficult to use reformation to create a security interest that's not properly recorded. I would submit that these facts of this case would allow Your Honor to reform the transfer documents.

To the extent that Your Honor believes that there may be at least one issue of material fact that's in dispute, we're prepared to endeavor to do some discovery very quickly on that, come back, have an evidentiary hearing if necessary. Again, we only received the debtor's opposition papers midweek last week. Our motion had been teed up in early September. So we moved quickly in preparing our reply. Frankly, from my personal perspective, I thought that the debtor's contention regarding the Buhre route not being included in the collateral was really on its face not a very credible statement.

THE COURT: But isn't it the case that if a distributor has a hundred or ninety-nine percent change in ownership from Mr. X to Mr. Y that Pepsi has to approve Mr. Y before the route is still affected. Don't they have that --

MR. MC AULIFFE: I believe so, Judge, and I think that happened and it was memorialized by this letter --

THE COURT: But --

MR. MC AULIFFE: -- which is again a conditional

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approval letter. I think its face --

THE COURT: But --

MR. MC AULIFFE: It says approved.

THE COURT: -- it wasn't -- but that was the first one, right? That was the first --

MR. MC AULIFFE: No, no, no, Judge. No, the first transaction occurred in December of 2012. Never happened. This was June of -- June 12th, 2013. That's the Pepsi conditional approval letter and then the second transaction occurred July 31st, 2013. So the second transaction occurred in reliance of this Pepsi approval letter which again it says in the first sentence:

"We are happy to inform you that your request for the purchase of Buhre Beverage...has been approved."

THE COURT: But it --

MR. MC AULIFFE: Subject to conditions thereafter to be satisfied. That was the conditions referenced with the transfer documents. Again, Your Honor, it was inartfully drafted by my predecessor but if we could just consider the extreme prejudice to my client --

THE COURT: But if you have a conditional approval that hasn't happened yet how can they really grant the lien?

MR. MC AULIFFE: Well, Judge, perhaps I'll need to do some discovery of Pepsi and find out how they traditionally and in other situations have approved transactions. I don't know

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if they're deviating from a prior procedure in place. I don't
know if they're acting --

THE COURT: Well, I don't know if it's really Pepsi or the parties' understanding. I mean, one of the limits on reformation under New York law is where the parties contract based on uncertain or contingent events. There are contingencies or conditions in that -- you know, in that approval.

MR. MC AULIFFE: Judge --

THE COURT: And, you know, I --

MR. MC AULIFFE: -- I would submit many of these contingencies are -- again, looking on Page 2 of the Pepsi approval letter, "secure your Class 3 license, make arrangements for proper uniforms, deposit 53,000 in your corporate checking account, continue to ride the route." This letter memorializes --

THE COURT: According to Mr. Sanchez, they didn't do any of that. They didn't know how to do it.

MR. MC AULIFFE: Mr. Sapra?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MC AULIFFE: Mr. Sapra -- it's my understanding
Mr. Sapra did not work the route as diligently as he could have
and --

THE COURT: Did he ever get the license?

MR. MC AULIFFE: I'm not sure, Judge.

THE COURT: Did he ever post the 56,000?

MR. MC AULIFFE: As I sit here right now, I'm not sure, Judge.

THE COURT: I mean, I --

MS. PENACHIO: Your Honor, if I may, it may -- this whole transaction is absurd including selling the route to a twenty-four-year old who didn't have a green card who had no experience --

THE COURT: Well --

MS. PENACHIO: -- and including giving \$100,000 in cash to Mr. Sanchez at two different banks, meeting him in Greenwich and handing him 30,000 in cash and meeting him in the Bronx. I just -- I need discovery. I don't -- and I don't know what happened.

THE COURT: Well, to me, the main issue is you both - I mean, as I said earlier, it would be -- it's argued by Mr.

McAuliffe that it's absurd for Mr. Sanchez to turn over his
business to Mr. Sapra and his son without having a lien on the
business including the most important asset which is the route.

On the other hand, Mr. Sapra argues with some credibility that it would be absurd for him to agree to pay over a million dollars for a business where he doesn't ultimately he can run it because Pepsi hasn't actually signed off on the dotted line on its consent.

Also, ameliorating Mr. Sanchez's argument is the fact

that he's argued that part of the deal was -- and I don't think Mr. Sapra disputes this -- that Mr. Sanchez was going to stay involved for several months, probably those months that it would take for there to be a clear answer on whether Pepsi was going to finally sign off on this thing.

So to me I don't think I can grant summary judgment here. It may turn out that that really was the deal, that, you know, everyone knew that Pepsi had signed off but I -- you know, looking at that letter, there are material conditions there, and the UC -- it's not -- I mean, every document says this. It's not just the contract, the UCC-1 and UCC-3 say this. You think if you're going to correct it, you'd correct it correctly. It still says Bruckner on the UCC-3, and it's -- in my mind, it's a lot -- that's in many -- leaving aside the summary judgment issue, to me when you're looking at UCC 9-506 you're looking at the notice provided to parties checking the UCC filings as to whether the collateral description if it's inaccurate would at least lead you somehow to find what the right collateral description is.

And I think it's a real stretch to say that listing the distribution agreement as the one between Bruckner and Pepsi as opposed to the one between Buhre and Pepsi or some other agreement -- you know, for example, I could certainly see them assigning the -- whatever rights are under that interim -- or initial consent but I have real doubts that a third party

wouldn't be seriously misled by the UCC-1 and the UCC-3 as to who -- as to what the collateral is.

Because, again, there's this underlying issue as to what it was that Buhre as owned by Sapra could assign. I just don't know how you could assign something that isn't yours.

MR. MC AULIFFE: Your Honor, this may lead us to an existential question. If this transfer which we believe -- which we're seeking to reform did not occur and was not effective, it wasn't transferred, does my client still own it?

THE COURT: Well, there was a transfer. It's just -you're just basically saying that I should assume that what was
meant by the transfer is different than what the documents say.

MR. MC AULIFFE: Which is exactly why we're relying on reformation, Judge.

THE COURT: Well, I know you're relying on it but it's a difficult standard.

MR. MC AULIFFE: I acknowledge that --

THE COURT: I mean, it's a clear and convincing proof standard, and I think you're basically ultimately relying on an argument that it would be absurd to hold otherwise and I can certainly see an alternative argument there, and the debtor submitted an affidavit that says, yeah, we didn't think that you were assigning the Buhre route.

MR. MC AULIFFE: We could do discovery; we'll find out if Mr. Sapra ever had any other interest in another Pepsi

route and I would doubt that he does --

THE COURT: Well, no, no, he would have a future interest in the Bruckner route, and to me it's logical that that's what he would assign, my future interest in it if I get one because otherwise why am I paying over a million dollars for something I can get kicked out of the next day if Pepsi sees, you know, that there's been a transfer.

Now, you may say that Pepsi knew all about it and everyone knew about it and -- but I think that's a matter for evidence.

MR. MC AULIFFE: And I totally understand, Your
Honor, and I think we will need discovery on Pepsi's knowledge
--

THE COURT: Well, maybe --

MR. MC AULIFFE: -- and when --

THE COURT: Maybe so.

MR. MC AULIFFE: -- they learned about the transaction.

THE COURT: Or -- well -- yeah, although I think ultimately it's the two parties to the transaction's knowledge really. I mean, your client basically said this is clear. It was meant to be an assignment of Buhre and so we'll see what Mr. Sapra and your client say under oath on that issue.

MR. MC AULIFFE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. So I am going to deny the motion

for summary judgment which seeks reformation of various transaction documents but only insofar as the motion seeks reformation of the transaction documents describing the collateral for the sale transaction. Because otherwise I believe that the defendant -- the only remaining defendant has acknowledged that the -- that otherwise the documents were mistaken in describing the buyer and the seller inaccurately.

So, just to be clear, the portion of the motion that I'm denying is that portion that seeks to reform the description of the collateral in the transaction documents as well as seeks a declaration that -- the description of that collateral in UCC-1 and UCC-3 that were filed satisfies UCC 9-506(a) in that it contains -- or they contain only minor errors or omissions that do not make the financing statement seriously misleading.

The parties accurately set forth the standard for summary judgment under Bankruptcy Rule 7056 which incorporates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

"Summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any, show that there's no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See <u>Celotex Corp. v.</u>
Catrett at 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

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In deciding the motion therefore, I must determine if there are any material factual issues to be tried while at the same time since the non-moving party would be precluded from a trial if the relief were granted resolving ambiguities and drawing reasonable inferences against the moving party. Knight v. U.S. Fire Insurance Company, 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2nd. Cir. 1986).

The burden therefore rests on the moving party to establish the absence of a genuine issue as to any material facts. Celotex, 477 U.S. 322, 323.

While the courts have held that the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of a non-moving position would be insufficient and that there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party and that the non-moving party may not defeat a summary judgment motion by relying on self-serving or conclusory statements and that there must be something more than some metaphysical doubt as to material facts. See generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) and Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

Once evidence of a material disputed fact has been submitted in support of an objection to a summary judgment motion, the Court although that evidence need not be probative must move on to the trial stage and deny the motion for summary judgment as long as that evidence raises a reasonable inference

in the non-moving party's favor. See Binder & Binder, P.C. v. Barnhart, 481 F.3d 141, 148 (2nd. Cir. 2007) and Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2nd Cir. 2004).

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Here, as I noted, the standard for a private reformation based on mutual mistake under New York law which would govern this dispute is a high one. Procedurally, there is a "heavy presumption that a deliberately prepared and executed written instrument manifests the true intention of the parties and a correspondingly high order of evidence is required to overcome that presumption." Backer Management Corp. v. Acme Quilting Company, 46 N.Y. 2d 211, 219-20. See also Chimart Associates v. Paul, 66 N.Y. 2d 570, 573-74 (1986).

Given that heavy burden, most courts in New York have acquired a showing of mutual mistake that would contradict the terms of the parties' agreements by clear and convincing evidence. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority, 735 F.Supp. 1205, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). And Seebold v. Halmar Construction Corp., 146 A.D. 2d 886, 886 (Third Dept. 1989).

Such evidence can be shown in a number of ways. part, it depends on the parties' sophistication and/or advice from counsel. Compare Chimart, 66 N.Y. 2d at 570 where there was sophisticated parties with counsel and Biscone v.

Carnivale, 186 A.D. 2d 942, 945 (App. Div. 1992) where the

CHH SHOOR ADOLLA ZUB-OF . ZUB -ULIVUD. CIVOCO SOOS LA-COLLADAM ▼▼ ・4月日00-14月201-01-00円 parties were not sophisticated. The presence of contradictory terms in an unreformed contract may also support a reformation claim. Winmar Co. v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity

Association of America, 870 F.Supp. 524, 535-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). And the parties' course of performance or subsequent behavior also may indicate their true intentions including the ultimate result which would be a mutually agreed correction after the fact. See Gulf Insurance Company v. Transatlantic Reinsurance Company, 69 A.D. 3d 71, 85 (1st Dept. 2009) and Henderson v. U.S. Postal Service, 1996 W.L. 662624 (W.D.N.Y. October 31, 1996).

Here, the key dispute is over whether a distributorship agreement which gave Buhre Beverage, the debtor, a exclusive route to deliver Pepsi products was assigned for security purposes to the plaintiff, Mr. Sanchez under the July 2013 transaction.

The document is consistent in describing the agreement that was assigned is not an assigned agreement between Buhre Beverage and Pepsi but rather an agreement between the prospective buyer, Bruckner Beverage Inc. -- or ultimate buyer and Pepsi which never came into effect. That was also what was reflected in the UCC-1 that was filed as well as the UCC-3 that was filed ostensibly to correct the parties' error.

The parties' Rule 7056 statements and their

respective affidavits or declarations dispute this very factual issue; i.e., was it intended by the parties that the prospective Bruckner Pepsi distribution agreement be assigned or alternatively as Mr. Sanchez contends the existing Buhre Beverage Pepsi agreement.

I conclude based on the record before me for purposes of this summary judgment motion that factual dispute is material and cannot be decided based on the materials that I need to take into account for a summary judgment motion. It's argued that it would be absurd to have sold the business or ninety-nine percent of the business to Messrs. — to Mr. Sapra and ultimately to Bruckner without getting an assignment back of the business's route but drawing as I must reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, I do not believe it is so clearly absurd, particularly given that if Sapra and Bruckner did not in fact have that agreement with Pepsi their money would be — their purchase that is would be wasted.

So I conclude that I cannot on a summary judgment motion enter an order reforming the agreement to reflect the collateral that the plaintiff believes was -- or should have been pledged to him.

I also conclude that the UCC-1 and UCC-3 as filed at least for purposes of Mr. Sanchez's summary judgment motion cannot be said to contain only minor errors or omissions that would not render the statements seriously misleading. The name

of the route -- I'm sorry, the name of the contract under which the route was assigned is not a matter of a typo or a transposition. Bruckner is very different from Buhre Beverage and I believe third parties quite arguably therefore would be seriously misled by both the UCC-1 and the UCC-3. See In Re: Sterling United, Inc., 2014 W.L. 49669 -- I'm sorry, 4966293 at Page 4 (Bankruptcy W.D.N.Y. October 3, 2014), and In Re: Soft Talk Publishing Company, Inc., 856 F.2d 13281332 [sic] (9th Cir. 1988) as well as ProGrowth Bank, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 558 F.3d 809, 812-813 (8th Cir. 2009).

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So I'll enter an order denying the motion and the 12 parties should meet and confer on a discovery schedule.

Given that result, I conclude that I should overrule Mr. Sanchez's objection to the sale. Clearly, his asserted security interest in the primary asset to be sold here the right to assume and assign a distributorship agreement is subject to bonafide dispute under Section 363(f)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.

I had serious doubts whether given the colloquy at the beginning of this hearing the sale price does clearly reflect the fair value of the assets to be sold, and therefore, I was uncomfortable ruling on the objection under Section 363(f)(3). See In Re: Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 332 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).

And I trust that I'll have a clearer record on that

CHH SHOOR ADOLLA ZUB-OF . ZUB -ULIVUD. CIVOCO SOOS LA-COLLADAM ▼▼ ・4月日00-14月201-01-00円 at the adjourned hearing but that would only be an alternative basis for denying the objection, that separate basis being 363(f)(4).

So, to be clear, the only two possible prospective bidders here if in fact Pepsi determines in the exercise of its reasonable judgment to withhold its approval of Mr. Poli would be Mr. Poli and the stalking horse bidder. I'm not reopening the auction generally but I do believe that there has been sufficient lack of clarity as to the basis for Pepsi's denial of approval as well as insufficient time to review Mr. Poli's proposal to cure the problem that Pepsi identified last week that would warrant extending the potential for an auction here until that process plays out.

And so I would like the debtor to submit an order just laying out the time table there after you get a date from Ms. Lee.

MS. PENACHIO: Yes, Your Honor, and I would just like to point out one minor -- albeit minor point. There is a small carve out for Mr. Cappelli. So if -- and that carve out --

THE COURT: You mean a breakup fee --

MS. PENACHIO: A break --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. PENACHIO: -- I'm sorry, a breakup fee. So it's

THE COURT: Right.

-- you know --

MS. PENACHIO: -- he's hung in there. I don't --1 that -- if he doesn't win, it's a small breakup fee but it will cover his expenses. So it's --THE COURT: Right. 4 MS. PENACHIO: -- you know, everyone is a winner if 5 6 there is an auction and --7 THE COURT: Correct. Okay. So you should get that 8 date from Ms. Lee. She was actually here so she knows that she needs to give you that hearing within thirty days. I'm happy if it's before then frankly but it should be at least within 11 that time frame. 12 MS. PENACHIO: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, there's one last motion. That's the Union's motion to --13 THE COURT: Oh, yeah, that's unopposed. 14 15 MS. PENACHIO: That's unopposed and --THE COURT: And it does appear that the Union didn't 16 get sufficient notice and -- of the bar date. I'll grant your 17 motion to file a late proof of claim. 18 19 MS. BRUNO: Thank you, Your Honor. If I may just make a correction to debtor's counsel -- by the way, I'm Susan Bruno from Cary Kane. Actually, the motion is not on behalf of the Union --22 23 THE COURT: It's the Fund.

Right.

-- the Fund is a separate entity --

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MS. BRUNO:

THE COURT:

1	MS. BRUNO: fund.
2	THE COURT: Right. The Union Fund.
3	MS. BRUNO: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.
4	THE COURT: Right. So
5	MR. WALDMAN: And
6	THE COURT: you can e-mail that order to chambers
7	MR. WALDMAN: Pepsi's motion for stay relief will be
8	adjourned
9	THE COURT: It's adjourned.
10	MR. WALDMAN: to the hearing date.
11	THE COURT: And it probably will become moot if the
12	sale goes through but if for some reason the sale doesn't go
13	through I'm in all likelihood going to grant it.
14	MR. WALDMAN: Thank you.
15	THE COURT: Okay.
16	MS. PENACHIO: Thank you, Your Honor.
17	MR. WALDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
18	(Concluded at 12:53 p.m.)
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from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the

Kathleen M. Price DATE: November 14, 2014

Kathleen Price, AAERT Cert. No. 325

10 Certified Court Transcriptionist

11 AD HOC TRANSCRIPTION, LLC

above-entitled matter.

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CERTIFICATION

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript